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## THE IVth CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL TRADES-UNION CO-OPERATION

by Svetozar VUKMANOVIĆ-TEMPO

Secretary General of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia

FOR considerations of space, I do not propose to enter here into an analysis of the significance of the 4th Congress of the Confederation of Trade Unions for the further development of socialist social relations in our country, as well as for the further development of the standard of living of the population. I merely intend to explain how much our Fourth Trade Union Congress has contributed, and how much it will contribute, to establishment of a larger international co-operation between the Trades-Union organizations of different countries, and with various ideological orientations on one hand, and how contributive it will be to a fuller acquaintanceship of wider workers' masses and their Trade Union organizations in all countries with the experiences of socialist construction in our country, on the other.

If the results of our Fourth Congress of the Confederation of Trade Unions on the international level are appraised from the viewpoint whether a larger unity has been realized in the international Trades-Union move-

ment, whether the Trade Union organizations from other countries have been able the better to familiarize themselves with our practice of the buildup of socialist social relations, and so on, then we have to record that the results achieved are not to be underrated.

First, of all, we must underline the fact that our Congress was attended by the representatives of over thirty-five Trade-Union organizations from different countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and America (including the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Israel, India, Japan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, and so on). So, our Congress was attended by the representatives of countries with varying social organizations and a varying level of economic development. Since all these delegations were afforded an opportunity to see in the field the mode in which a socialist social organization is realized in practice and what this organi-

zation is like under our conditions, one may freely say that a significant stride has been made toward a wider acquaintanceship of the working-class with the results of the buildup of socialist social relations in our country to date. However, it is not enough merely to show the results of the hitherto buildup of socialist relations in our country and take it that that settles our obligation to the international labour movement. It is far more important to represent to the foreign Trades-Union organizations not only the results marked, but the problems which used to arise or which keep arising in practice in the construction of socialist social relations. To conceal or leave unsaid the problems met with in the practice of construction of socialism means nothing else but a desire to „export” one's system to other countries. And this is just what we did not want to achieve when we showed to foreign delegations how the construction of socialist social relations was being realized in our country. We have been and remain, conscious of the fact that the forms and methods of the construction of socialism must correspond to the concrete conditions in each country and that something which is yielding sound results in our conditions must not necessarily do likewise in other countries, under different conditions. Why should we conceal then from foreign delegations the problems arising, the wrong solutions of individual questions, and so on? Such a comprehensive representation of the successes, and the failures, of the correct solutions which have yielded particular negative results, and so on, can contribute to an effective enrichment of experiences in the construction of socialist social relations in larger international proportions. On the other hand, such a system of acquaintanceship with the experiences in the construction of socialism in individual countries serves also to consolidate mutual confidence, equality in mutual relations, and so on, since to conceal the existence of problems, too, beside successes, cannot but arouse the mistrust of the ones regarding the sincerity of the intentions of the others. Our Trades-Union activists are conscious that the forms and methods of development of socialist social relations in our country correspond to our conditions and that many of our experiences can usefully be applied in other countries also (adapted to the conditions there, of course). But they are simultaneously conscious of the fact, too, that not everything we have applied in our country is the acme of achievement and that there are many things which have yielded good results elsewhere and which can be applied in our conditions also, with sound results. With this awareness, our Trades-Union activists have done everything to represent to the foreign delegations the whole pattern of problems of the construction of socialism in conditions of a backward country, which had been forced to strive concurrently for lifting itself from economic backwardness and for the construction of socialist social relations. Viewed from that angle, the Fourth Congress integrally, and particularly through the field tour of the delegations, may freely be said to have done a great deal to make the Yugoslav experiences of socialist construction accessible to Trades-Union organizations in many countries of the world, which fact cannot fail to contribute to the further drawing-together of workers on an international scale.

Not less important is the fact, too, that our Con-

gress was attended by the representatives of many Trades-Union organizations with widely varying ideological and political orientations. Thus there were represented 12 Trades-Union organizations affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions and 12 Trades-Union organizations affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Besides, there were represented also 11 Trades-Union organizations belonging to no international organization at all. What is the implication of such a composition of the Trades-Union organizations? Such an ideologically and politically varying composition of the Trades-Union organizations represented at our Congress shows that it is possible to achieve a certain unification of Trades-Union organizations subject to adoption of a healthy basis of co-operation and that a different ideological and political orientation or affiliation with individual international organizations must not necessarily constitute an insuperable obstacle to co-operation. It is not accidental that such a co-operation has been witnessed precisely at our Congress, for our past and present policy of co-operation provides a sound basis upon which co-operation in the international Trade-Union Movement can be built. Our idea is, namely, that co-operation between different Trades-Union organizations inside individual countries or between different countries should be based not the momentary and tactical needs of the one or the other Trades-Union organization, but on the durable interests of all the organizations pursuing co-operation.

Similarly a durable unity and co-operation cannot be built without an equal co-operation of all the organizations, without distinction as to ideological and political orientation. And a durable international-scale co-operation between Trades-Union organizations cannot be realized without perfect respect for the principle that the working-class in each country has the right itself to determine both the forms and methods of the striving for realization of its rights and the forms and methods of construction of socialist social relations, and to on. International Trade-Union co-operation can prove beneficial only provided that it is founded on such a principle, that it enables a comprehensive familiarizing with the achievements in each individual country, and that it makes it possible to leave the utilization of these experiences to the discretion of the Trades-Union organizations concerned. These principles, as is known, have long since been adopted in our practice and, therefore, it is not accidental that it should have come just at our Congress to this significant international manifestation of solidarity of the working-class.

None the less one should not overrate the significance of this international manifestation, for it is a fact that about a half of the Trades-Union organizations invited did not send their representatives to our Congress. It is not a question of the non-attendance of individual delegations from Africa and America, which sent their best wishes for the successful work of the Congress. However, it is pertinent to deal specially with the non-attendance of individual Trades-Union organizations, since their refusal to attend reflects, after all, their entire conception as regards the relations in the labour movement and in the socialist world at large.

In point of fact, some Trades-Union organizations which are affiliated with the World Federation of Trade

Unions (China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Mongolia, Albania) had refused, under various excuses, to send their representatives to our Congress. Even though a majority of these Trades-Union organizations did not state the real reasons for their non-attendance of our Congress, one still may record that the reasons for this non-attendance lie in the conception of the responsible leaders of these organizations, who consider that any Trades-Union organization which does not wholly accept the experience of the one or the other largest country of socialism is „an agent of the class enemy” and that there can be no co-operation whatsoever with such organizations. Such a conception was also openly expressed in the letter of the Central Council of Albanian Trade Unions in which it was refused to attend our Congress because we were not adopting the experience of individual socialist countries (to say nothing of the expressions employed in the same letter, which are uncanny in the international Trade-Union Movement, for another thing). So, this letter of the Albanian Trade Unions has helped to explain fully the reasons of the non-attendance of representatives also from those other countries in which Stalinist conceptions and a Stalinist policy are still deeply rooted.

Some other Trades-Union organizations which are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions had other reasons for refusing to attend our Congress. Some of these organizations (North America, Canada) did not even want to answer our invitation, while some others from European countries (Scandinavia, Germany, France, Switzerland and others) found more or less neat excuses to avoid attendance. In essence, though, in the case of these organizations, too, the same conceptions were involved, i. e., that international co-operation is feasible only on condition that each Trades-Union organization must adopt the conceptions on which the

Trade Unions affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions were built. And if the workers in a country, or a part of the workers in a country, do not want to have a Trades-Union organization established on such principles? By following such a course, the same conceptions are arrived at, from the other side, of imposing upon individual organizations from the outside the one or the other forms of construction of a socialist society, or the one or the other forms of struggle for realization of the workers' rights, and so on. Of course, concepts of this type, too, are untenable and international labour solidarity and the unity of realization of a larger unity and solidarity of the built by transcending all these harmful concepts. It seems to me that one may say that in this respect, too, the 4th Congress of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia constitutes a stride forward along the line of realization of a larger unity and solidarity of the international labour movement, and particularly the international Trade-Union Movement.

In conclusion, I must underline that at this Congress it not only came to a familiarizing of foreign Trades-Union organizations with the experiences of socialist construction in Yugoslavia, but that their presence was utilized so that our Trade-Union activists may learn to know as much as possible about the experiences from the work of the Trades-Union organizations from all countries. The attitude of our Trades-Union organization is that there is no country, and no Trades-Union organization, from which something cannot be learned and from whose experience something cannot be turned to account for our country also. Such a mutual acquaintanceship — to which we have devoted, and are devoting, special attention — has also given to this Congress the stamp of international solidarity and both-sided familiarizing and drawing-together.

## Current Topics

### THE MEETING AT GENEVA

by Dr. Aleš BEBLER

THE FOUR Foreign Ministers met at Geneva the other day. At long last, those will say who, profoundly anxious that the idea of such a conference be consummated, had welcomed and upheld it from the very beginning. Also we, Yugoslavs, have been among them.

The preparations had taken a long time. There were numerous contacts, conversations, written exchanges of proposals and suggestions. Such a pattern of the whole world public was caused to feel and understand the delicate nature and gravity of the problems the representatives of the countries participating in the present

conference were to face. The preparatory phase has prepared not only the governments themselves and their foreign ministries, but public opinion. And it has so prepared it that it will not be seriously disappointed if, at the first try, at a Foreign Ministers' conference, inside a few weeks, the problems tackled are not settled. Today it is aware that problems are involved for the settlement of which years are necessary with a series of similar conferences, at different levels, and varying as to composition. As a result, the public regards the present conference at Geneva as a meeting opening a series of meetings and conferences on the relevant questions, the

questions of Europe, disarmament and others, within the United Nations framework or without it. In other words, the world's peace-loving public opinion sees the meeting at Geneva as the beginning of a new era, an era of consistent and persevering negotiations for a gradual liquidation of the cold war.

However, if public opinion is not going to be disappointed in case now, on this Geneva occasion, no satisfactory definitive solutions are found for the most difficult issues, it would be seriously disappointed by two contingencies, viz.

1. In case the Foreign Ministers parted company without results, and the governments concerned (or a majority of those governments) concluded that a new meeting on the same or a higher level was hopeless and beside the point therefore;

2. In case the Geneva conference failed to open prospects and discover possibilities for a gradual solution of the questions mooted.

Avoidance of the last is the task of the ministers forgathered at Geneva. It is up to them to realize a successful beginning of the settlement of the most difficult European issues.

What are the conditions for such a successful start?

The Foreign Ministers are confronted by a European problem resolving itself into four component parts: Berlin, the Peace Treaty with Germany, German unification, European security. Of course, by their substance, these four constituents are closely interconnected. However, unconvincing conclusions are sometimes drawn from this fact. Opinions are heard that none of these issues can be settled divorced from another, that it is necessary to find a complex and satisfactory solution for all four simultaneously, or else there can be no solving of any. Or, which is not much better, that settlement of one of those matters is conditioned, perforce, by the settlement of a second or third of them. In other words, from the interconnected nature of the component parts of the European problem conclusions are drawn which create, so to speak, insuperable procedural difficulties and complications. For inevitably, each conference will have own pattern of associations and conditionings on the subject. To take this road would virtually be tantamount to looking for fresh, as large as possible difficulties in connection with the settlement of each separate question and postponing every settlement ad Calendas Graecas.

In our opinion, the Foreign Ministers assembled at Geneva would be able to achieve a certain initial result provided that they seek initial results for each of the mentioned questions without an artificial, procedural interconnecting and conditioning for which the foundation is lacking in the real elements of the questions broached.

In each of these questions an initial result is feasible provided that the efforts of all the conferees would be concentrated on settlement through approximation of the outlooks. And this is possible only in case the conferees displayed a readiness gradually, by mutual concessions, to renounce their past attitudes.

We shall be saying nothing new by pointing out that the past attitudes have been downright impregnated with bloc-conceptions. They have reflected the desire of each bloc to consolidate its positions, to score some

points in the struggle against the opposing bloc. True, in accordance with the general trend in the East-West relations, these attitudes have evolved in a positive way during the last years. From the attitudes from the time of the "roll-back" and the Berlin blockade to the present attitudes, a certain distance has been covered in a positive direction. *De facto* recognition has been granted to the *status quo* in Europe, or we are near such a recognition. The existence of the present-day borders of Poland and the existence of the East German state no longer are, or are ceasing to be, disputed questions. We have progressed far enough to raise certain questions whose settlement would denote a change of this *status quo* for the better. We have reached the realization that the *status quo*, recognized or not, is, with its inherent qualities, a source of tensions which can and must be eliminated or else we may be thrown back some day into a fresh eruption of more acute forms of the cold war. The new measures in the field of atomic armament — pending hydrogen armament — in Europe during the past year are illustrative enough of this peril.

From this it follows, with irrefutable logic, that solutions of European questions and the whole European problem can only be found if the mutual concessions of the East and West are such as to signify a qualitative change. They have to evolve from bloc-positions toward something new, toward positions which would amount to a readiness to start healing in Europe the cut from the scalpel: the division of spheres of interest made at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.

The peoples of Europe which have headed the development of the world's civilization and culture for centuries could shine even today, with their achievements in the fields of science, technology and arts, far more than they are actually doing by desisting from wearing themselves out in mutual disputes, from indulgence in a mutual modern-armaments race, and so on. The cold war has turned the nucleus of world civilization and culture into the nucleus of world tensions.

As a result, the peoples of Europe are specially concerned for termination of the cold war and transcendence of the bloc-division of the world. It is not surprising that during the past year, when rays of hope had appeared for a concerted settlement of European questions, Europeans took such an interest in those proposals and suggestions which had, as it were, a supra-bloc character, which comprised the elements of blunting the bloc-division and a gradual deletion of bloc-frontiers. I am referring to the proposals for settlement of the question of European security by creating a disarmed zone, or at least an army thinout, in Central Europe over an area covering territories on both sides of the present bloc-border.

Any progress which might now be made in Geneva in this matter would therefore command the greatest significance. It would produce most profoundly positive psychological repercussion and would facilitate the settlement of all the remaining questions.

In the efforts made in such a direction, the participation of Yugoslavia, as a country uncommitted to the blocs, could be of great benefit. For years past, her efforts have been aimed in the only direction in which more durable solutions can in fact be found for those

questions which were unsolved just on account of the division of the world into blocs. And this primarily includes the German question and the question of Europe as a whole.

From this point of view, incorporation of Yugoslavia (who, as an ally from the Second World War, has

all the legitimations for participation too) would constitute also an important good omen from the outside for the mood of the original participants in the negotiations. Incorporation of Yugoslavia would portend their desire to find positive and constructive solutions for the European problem.

## International Relations of FPRY

# The Scandinavian Countries and Yugoslavia

by Maks BAĆE

Secretary of Foreign Political Committee of Federal People's Assembly

**I**N RECENT years the development of relations between the Scandinavian countries and Yugoslavia has been accompanied by certain feelings which are rather difficult to define. Perhaps the difficulty is just because they are not yet crystallized, though among them there are feelings of real mutual respect, understanding and even closeness. If one can speak at all about such relations, one may say that they are in no respect a matter of the distant past and tradition, but represent a relatively new manifestation. Yugoslavia has found herself with the Scandinavian countries at the United Nations, in the same room and at the same table where, since the Second World War, she has made new acquaintanceships with a number of countries of the old and, so to say, the new world.

This does not mean that there were no connections and relations between the Scandinavian countries and Yugoslavia or old Serbia before, and of course the war itself should not be forgotten either. Yugoslavia was not only the victim of the same enemy, invader and occupier as Denmark and Norway, but also hundreds of Yugoslavs shared the fate of imprisonment with the people of Scandinavia and received help from them, so that they often shared intimate as well as tragic experiences. We feel that the Yugoslav graves in that part of the world are lying in a good and friendly country.

A real political acquaintanceship developed, however, in the period when Europe and the world began to be reorganized, when problems and disputes were being solved, with more or less success, on the international plane at the green conference-table. At that time it was realized that, in spite of distance, of differences in history, religion, economic development, social structure, and even mentality, the Scandinavian countries and Yugoslavia often had similar and sometimes even identical views on the world, its problems and the means of solving them. Even the differences in alignment or non-alignment in the various military blocs have not presented any serious obstacle to the development of this similarity of viewpoint, to the widening of friendship and to the deepening of understanding.

A question as to the reasons or circumstances which have made possible such a development in spite of the above differences which still exist, may at once be asked. I think that we can divide these into three groups.

The first circumstance is the appearance of new world relations during the Second World War and in the postwar period. Although some countries — most of them unfortunately the strongest and most important participants in the Second World War — are beginning to forget the friendships and unions into which they were forced by the instinct for self-preservation, yet for many nations the relations set up at that time remain politically, practically or morally in full force. On the Scandinavian countries, just as on Yugoslavia, Hitler forced a life and death struggle. The resistance and struggle of the Scandinavian people against the German invasion was united with the common struggle, to which Yugoslavia contributed all her strength. Although separate, their destinies were linked, and their present existence and freedom is based on the defeat of one and the same enemy. Yugoslavia emerged from the war new and reborn; and the Scandinavian countries preserved their independence and individuality. Have not our destinies been linked and made mutually interdependent? Among these circumstances can also be counted the postwar resistance of Yugoslavia to the dictates of Stalin, and the ten-year long resistance of Yugoslavia to the pressure of the USSR and the whole Eastern bloc. One has the impression that while Yugoslavia resists, others are also experiencing the same thing, even if to a lesser extent. Only thus can be interpreted the interest in the struggle and the sympathy for Yugoslavia's cause.

The second circumstance lies in the fact that Yugoslavia and the five Scandinavian countries (including Iceland) are considered among the medium or small countries of Europe — in world proportions definitely among the small. This common geographical and political feature tells us that by their very nature these countries have had in the past and will have in the future some mutual interests and perhaps even identical enemies. Both have had and still have the same great neighbours

in Europe. In this respect, England on one side and Turkey for the other represented the chief and perhaps most characteristic difference. This difference has in any case symbolized their varying destinies up to now. Whether in Europe or in the world at large, the similarity in position of the small countries is becoming more marked every day. The logical development of great powers and their endeavour to decide the fate of other countries is the common problem of all the small countries of the world, but in the case of the Scandinavian countries and Yugoslavia it is not only a question of the minimum, that is, preservation of the national independence, but also of the maximum, which is their active contribution to the construction of a world in which there will be room for both great and small.

Some of the Scandinavian countries are members of the western military bloc. We do not approve of blocs. But we fully believe that those Scandinavian countries entered the bloc because they were convinced that this was the best way to ensure their self-defence. One has the impression, however, that even these countries have attached themselves to one of the blocs as a lesser evil, but that they are still conscious that it is in any case an evil. The question remains, however, as to whether that is really the best way, not only for them but also for all of us. The other Scandinavian countries are not members of blocs, Sweden being the most prominent Western country not aligned to any. Her contribution to the soothing of bloc-passions and her endeavours to find a peaceful means of solving international disputes have often been close to the Yugoslav conceptions. In the postwar period Sweden and Yugoslavia have acted together on many questions, and this union was never the expression of mutual immediate interests, but of much wider, even world interests, in which India and several other countries often joined.

Yugoslavia holds the firm conviction that the Scandinavian countries are not only peace-loving countries, but that they are deeply interested and always ready, together with the other well-intentioned countries, to seek such solutions to the great international questions as are also desired by Yugoslavia. In essence this means peace, independence (which in practice means the independence of small countries from large ones) and such political and economic relations between countries as will help the general progress of the world.

These two circumstances would in themselves be sufficient for excellent relations between our countries. There is, however, another which is perhaps just as important as the first two, but which is, in any case, the most characteristic in our relations. This is socialism. In spite of all differences, socialism is the main factor which draws the Scandinavian countries and Yugoslavia together. In the Scandinavian countries the capitalist system, and not the socialist social system, is still applied but of the whole capitalist world they are the closest to socialism. It is characteristic that Sweden, for instance, in the same year as the October Revolution in Russia co-opted into the Government Brantig, the leader of the Socialist Party, and that this Party has been in power almost continuously since 1932. A similar situation exists in the other Scandinavian countries too. Of the whole capitalist world these countries have probably made the most progress in social reforms. Wages

are high and the standard of living is the highest, or among the highest in Europe. If equitable distribution of national income is considered, their standard of living, even in comparison with the American standard, is very high. In foreign policy the Scandinavian socialists are not saddled with the burden of an Empire and colonies, as their English and other friends are. The Yugoslav communists are not dogmatic about the Scandinavian socialists. They do not agree at all that all socialists should be labelled "agents of the bourgeoisie". If one can say that Guy Mollet does not represent the true interests of the French working class, one can by no means say the same about Erlander, Gerhardsen or Hansen, regarding their working class and their people. The Yugoslavs are very much interested in the experiences of the Scandinavian socialists, while the latter have shown great interest in workers' self-management, socialist democracy and other achievements of Yugoslav socialism.

All these relations are still under mutual observation, where the efforts of one side are more or less respected, and the successes of the other more or less appreciated. There is still much, indeed a great deal, to do to make this understanding of greater service both to Yugoslav and Scandinavian socialism. But in spite of this, socialism is, above all, that which typifies relations between these countries. This relationship is not external, it does not manifest itself publicly, but its internal strength is therefore very great. The basis for public manifestation remains those two first elements, the element of a common enemy and similar destinies in war, and that of the common interest of small countries and their right to an independent life, freedom and equal participation in deciding the fate of the world. When there is added to these, national and indeed international common interests, and essentially identical interests in the construction of their own society without exploitation and on a higher material and spiritual level, in more convenient and appropriate international relations, then these countries certainly have very much in common.

## To our readers

The editors of the "Review of International Affairs" kindly request our readers to send their observations, wishes and objections concerning the general conception of the review, the amount of space allotted to the individual columns and subjects especially those relating to the Yugoslav reality, the treatment of individual subject and quality of the articles, style, language etc., to the editorial office, Beograd, Jovanova 16. The editors thank the readers in advance for the valuable assistance thus extended.

## The XIVth Session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe

by Bogdan CRNOBRNJA

THERE are few European organizations or meetings at which the delegations of all European countries may convene and deliberate problems of common interest. For this reason the UN Economic Commission for Europe is invested with special significance. The Commission has succeeded in overcoming the most difficult years of the cold war and has remained, during the entire post-war period, the only institution in Europe in which the European representatives have convened from time to time in order to examine the economic situation. This circumstance warrants a favourable appraisal of the role of the Commission, regardless of the fact that the concrete results accomplished at the individual sessions have often been modest.

The existing political relations in Europe during the past ten years have tended to divide Europe, thus inevitably restricting the scope of activity of the Commission. The adoption of bloc doctrines has inevitably led to struggles over bloc interests. This has impaired the prospects for general and universal international cooperation. Although it may be said, generally speaking, that the position of the other regions in the world is essentially similar (owing to the influence of identical or kindred factors) the European situation is characterized by certain specific features. One of these is the extreme division of Europe brought about by social changes and other factors. This circumstance has inevitably influenced the activities of EEC.

Even under these conditions the Commission has a good record behind it. Since its inception, Yugoslav policy has aimed at assisting this organ of the United Nations helping its affirmation and the reaching of such all-European solutions as would enable the existing difficulties to be overcome in the common European interest.

Needless to say, this year's session was no exception, although it was marked by several characteristic features, which are worth mentioning.

It is only natural that meetings of this kind should be closely connected with the general situation in the world and in Europe in particular. Consequently the specific and novel factors which may be discerned at present on the international scene were also in evidence during the session of the Commission. Owing to the forthcoming foreign ministers' conference in Geneva and the known objectives of this meeting, the degree of political responsibility of all the delegations was increased. All the delegations, and primarily those of the big powers, could not assume the responsibility before the world public for the improvement of the "climate" at the session.

The forthcoming foreign ministers' conference, although a positive political act in itself, was used in a negative sense by some delegations, who actually affirmed that as such a meeting was impending, the Commission should abstain from taking any far-reaching decisions, so as not to prejudice coming events. The Yugoslav delegation adopted exactly the opposite view, considering that significant unanimous decisions of the Commission might provide a useful contribution to the forthcoming meeting.

With the exception of certain propagandist elements in the pronouncements of the Eastern and Western delegations, the ensuing discussion, to a certain extent, reflected the economic and political situation in Europe and the world at large.

a) The tendency to an ever-greater disparity in the rate of development between Eastern and Western Europe is becoming increasingly obvious. All the generally known facts and the discussions of the various delegations point to this conclusion, which also ensues from the European Economic Survey for 1958 (issued by the Secretariat of the EEC).

b) In view of the statements made by the individual delegations on their plans for future economic development, the gap may be expected to widen at a still more rapid rate in the future.

c) Many Western delegations (as well as the Survey) noted that, contemplated as a whole, the Western economies are stagnating. This general appraisal is not in the least altered by the fact that the symptoms of stagnation are not so evident in some Western countries. It was likewise stated that there is a great deal of uncertainty as regards the future economic development of Western Europe. In view of the foregoing, the arguments in favour of a deflationist and stable monetary policy do not sound very convincing. Time will show whether entirely new institutional changes are necessary.

Careful attention was devoted at the session to co-operation with the under-developed regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

d) Contemplated in terms of long-rangs effects, several highly significant economic and political events took place last year. This refers for example to the establishment of the Common Market, the strengthening of economic ties between the member-countries of the Eastern European Economic Organization, the adoption of convertibility by some West European countries, the modification of the full employment policy aiming at monetary stability etc.

The Commission should devote greater attention to all these events, as they fully deserve it because of their economic and other effects.

As a modest contribution to the fourteenth session of the EEC the Yugoslav delegation:

— indorsed the view that the United Nations should to an ever-greater extent become the platform and instrument for transcending economic division in the world and sub-regional integration, which is conditioned and determined by a policy of exclusiveness, and suggested that the activities of the Commission be channelled towards more important international problems.

— Urged that the EEC should become a place where contacts between the East and West European integration organizations would be created, and also that the Commission or some other United Nations Agency should provide a platform for talks between countries which are taking part in the integration schemes of third countries.

— stressed that the policy of negotiation or coexistence on the economic plane is the only way to eliminate and settle the existing difficulties:

— give its contribution, even if modest, by participating in all, including the secondary activities of the EEC, through various agencies which are engaged in the great practical task of international cooperation.

Guided by these motives, the Yugoslav delegation proposed to the Commission a resolution concerning the effects of sub-regional integration tendencies in Europe, while laying particular stress on the eventual effects of such tendencies on third countries. As stated in the propounding of the resolution:

*„The existing differences between the various processes leading to sub-regional integration are not of primary importance for us in this Commission. Our purpose is to offer assistance in devising a common basis on which international cooperation would continue to develop. The Yugoslav draft resolution primarily deals with the eventual effects of sub-regional integration on the economies of third countries and international relations in general.*

*„In submitting this draft resolution, the Yugoslav delegation has no intention of assessing the good or bad points of various integration schemes. It only wishes to reaffirm Yugoslav readiness to devote the necessary*

attention to the interests of all countries in the common effort to promote economic cooperation. This draft resolution appeals to all countries taking part in various integration schemes to foster contacts which may lead to mutually acceptable solutions“.

The resolution was welcomed as a useful initiative by the vast majority, as it aims at strengthening mutual confidence. Before adopting the resolution, the member countries of the Common Market convened in Brussels and took a favourable attitude towards the resolution. All members of the Commission voted in favour of the Yugoslav resolution, with the exception of the Soviet Union and the East European countries which abstained. It is hard to find any motive underlying the attitude of the Soviet Union and the East European countries, except the wish to isolate Yugoslavia, irrespective of the fact that such an initiative can only contribute to the promotion of international understanding. It is obvious that the attitude is contrary to the various proposals advanced by these countries at the session

The Commission adopted several resolutions which, although devoid of any far-reaching significance, should not be underrated. Some of these resolutions mark a step forward in the advancement of European understanding, and may prove a useful prelude to still more profitable decisions in the future.

## Dynamic Changes in Africa

by Fenner BROCKWAY, M. P.

Chairman of the Movement for Colonial Freedom

1960 will be decisive for the Continent of Africa. More peoples and territories will gain their independence in that year than in any previous year. The list will be composed of Nigeria, Somalia, the Cameroons and Togoland.

Nigeria is the largest of the British colonies. Indeed, when its thirty-five million people become independent, half the non-self-governing population in the British Empire will be freed politically at one stroke.

Somalia, the Cameroons and Togoland are trusteeship territories under the United Nations: the first administered by Italy, the latter two by France. The United Nations have decided that they become independent next year.

Somalia is bordered by French and British Somaliland. Their peoples will certainly demand freedom and unity in a Greater Somalia when the Italian area is liberated.

Togoland and the Cameroons are also divided at present. The British portion of Togoland has decided by plebiscite to join Ghana. The British portion of the Cameroons will shortly decide whether to remain with Nigeria or to join the French Cameroons. Whatever the decision, they will be part of independent territories next year.

The importance of 1960 for Africa extends, however, far beyond the territories which I have named. The most critical issue to be decided will be in East and Central Africa, where the whole future of race relations on the Continent will be determined. When the Africans of Kenya, Nyasaland and the Rhodesias win democratic equality, European political superiority in all Africa will be doomed. Not even South Africa can maintain *apartheid* in isolation and against the pressure of events in the rest of the Continent.

During the last decade Kenya has been the chief scene of conflict. First, there was the political agitation, led by Jomo Kenyatta, challenging the appropriation of the best land by the White Settlers and demanding political rights. These claims rejected, a section of the African people turned to the violence of Mau Mau. This revolt was crushed three years ago, and in the election which followed a limited number of Africans were permitted to vote for the first time. They were allotted six of the twenty-eight elected members. Later this was increased to fourteen. The table below gives the racial composition of Kenya and the number of elected representatives from each group in the Legislature.

Race	Population	Elected Representation
Africans	6,000,000	14
Asians	160,000	6
Europeans	60,000	14
Arabs	40,000	2

In addition, the members of the Legislature as a body including ex-officio and nominated members appointed by the Governor, elect twelve members, four Africans, four Europeans, four Asians.

The Africans have not accepted this undemocratic Constitution. A year ago they proposed that a constitutional expert from Britain should prepare recommendations for a new Constitution and that this should be considered by a round-table conference representing all the races and the British Government. This very moderate proposal was rejected by the

British and Kenya Governments, whereupon the Africans decided to boycott the Legislature. A little later the Asian representatives, in a splendid gesture of solidarity, also decided to leave the Legislature in support of the African claims.

The Constitution had thus broken down. It could not be pretended that the Legislature was representative when it did not include elected representatives from the two largest races. The pressure for a change was strengthened when an Arab and a European representative agreed to join the Africans and Asians in an inter-racial delegation to London.

A very clever policy was adopted to meet this situation. The most influential European representative, Mr. Michael Blundell, resigned from the Government and formed a new Group which endorsed the idea of a round-table conference, although its manifesto was generally vague and indefinite. In these circumstances the British Government accepted the proposal for a report by a constitutional expert to be followed by a round-table conference next year. Thus for Kenya, as well, 1960 will be a decisive year.

The African and Asian elected members have now returned to the Legislature, but the difficulties are by no means over. The Africans are asking that the Government shall state categorically that the aim in Kenya is to establish full democracy with adult suffrage irrespective of race. The British Government has not gone further than to say that it aims at the establishment of democratic Parliamentary institutions. The Africans are also insisting on the termination of the State of Emergency declared at the time of the Mau Mau revolt, the release of all those detained without trial (including Jomo Kenyatta, who is still exiled in a distant village although he has completed his prison sentence), and the legalisation of an African political organisation for the whole of Kenya. At present only separate district organisations are permitted. The outlook is more hopeful. There is a better atmosphere between the races. But the fundamental decisions have still to be made.

One of the reasons which has led the British Government to a more conciliatory attitude in Kenya is undoubtedly the crisis which is reaching a climax in nearby Central Africa. Here, too, the decisive date will be 1960, when the political structure of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland is to come under review. It is not too much to say that the issues to be decided reflect the biggest crisis in British imperial history since the struggle for the independence of India which ended by the triumph of Gandhi and Nehru and the National Congress in 1947.

The dominant Europeans in the Federation have been carefully preparing both the psychology and the practical conditions for the 1960 review. It will take place at a conference representing five governments: Britain, the Federation, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By a policy of co-operation between the Conservative Government in London and the Federal Government, representation will be heavily weighted against any satisfaction of African claims.

The population in Central Africa consists of seven million Africans and three hundred thousand Europeans. The maximum representation which this vast majority of Africans can obtain in the Federal Parliament is one-third of the membership. It is therefore clear that the Federal vote at the 1960 Conference will be pro-European. In Southern Rhodesia there are 200,000 Europeans and 2½ million Africans. There is not a single elected African in the Legislature in Northern Rhodesia, the African majority has only one-third representation. In Nyasaland the Europeans are only an insignificant numerical group in the population, but nevertheless have a majority in the Legislature. It has been largely because the British Government has delayed so long in establishing a new Constitution, giving the Africans the majority to which they are entitled, that the recent troubles have arisen in Nyasaland. The Africans realise that the vote of their Government will go against them at the 1960 Conference.

The one doubt in the minds of the Europeans in the Federation about the Conference which is to meet next year is the nature of the representation of the British Government. We shall have a General Election before then and it is quite possible that a Labour Government will replace the Tories. The Federal Europeans are alarmed at this prospect. Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime Minister, has twice hinted that the Whites will stage a "Boston Tea Party" if a Labour Government resists their claim to throw off the last vestiges of control over them from Britain. It will be remembered that it was the action of the White Colonialists in America in throwing overboard a British cargo of tea at Boston which began the War of Independence. Sir Roy Welensky is not alone in creating this panic psychology. Lord Malvern, who was Sir Roy's predecessor as Federal Prime Minister, recently flew to London to take part in a House of Lords debate, when he threatened that the Whites would "go it alone" if Britain resisted their demands.

Why is it that Central Africa should have become the scene of the crisis between the Whites and the Africans in this way? Partly it is due to the fact that the 300,000 Europeans have made the Rhodesias their country. The climate is favourable, much of the land is rich, and valuable mineral resources have been found. The Europeans have lived as an isolated community on a social scale far beyond African intrusion. They have lived a life of comparative ease, with many African servants. The Africans have been excluded from their hotels and restaurants. There have been separate entrances and counters at the Post Offices and Africans have had to buy articles through hatches in the walls of shops which can be entered by Europeans alone. Whenever Europeans and Africans have had to queue together for any requirement, it has been accepted that a European goes to the head of the queue. In the industries, the Africans have not been allowed to be trained for any skilled jobs. The Europeans have regarded the mass of Africans as outside the pale of civilisation.

Recently there have been changes in some of these restrictions. There is a Federal inter-racial college, but few Africans have been able to enter because there is little provision for their secondary education, and even at this college the Europeans and the Coloured have been accommodated in separate houses. Under the pressure of criticism from liberal circles in Britain, some hotels have been opened to Africans, though very few can afford to meet the charges, and the restaurants in railway trains are now open to the rare African who can meet the cost of a meal. The new Post Offices are to be built without separate entrances and counters. Negotiations are proceeding to allow Africans to rise a little higher in grades of jobs in the mining industry and on the railways.

At the back of this racial segregation, with privilege and comfort on the one hand, and social ostracism and poverty on the other, are the vast European economic interests in the Rhodesias. In December, 1953, the United Nations published a report on Social Conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. It showed that one-third of the total wealth produced in Northern Rhodesia passes annually in interest, dividend and profit to financiers living in Britain, America and other investing countries. The profits made from the copper mines are fantastic. They are probably the highest made in any part of the British Empire. Recently they have fallen because of the drop in copper prices, but here are the figures for three companies:

Company	Dividends
Rhokana Corporation	350% / 225% / 125%
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines	150% / 100% / 50%
British South Africa Company	35% / 30% / 30%
	1956 1957 1958

Leading political figures are directors of these companies. Lord Malvern is the Resident Director of the British South Africa Company. Mr. Julian Amery, M. P. only resigned from the directorship of the British South Africa Company to be-

come the British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1957. Mr. C. J. Holland-Martin, M. P., a brother-in-law of the British Prime Minister, and Joint Honorary Treasurer of the Conservative Party since 1947, is chairman of Rhodesia-Katanga, Ltd. and a director of Nyasaland Railways. Captain Charles Waterhouse, who was a leader of the imperialist group in the House of Commons which opposed the withdrawal of the British forces from the Suez invasion, is also a director of Rhodesia-Katanga. I could give a long list of Conservatives who are associated with big business in Central Africa. Indeed, when colonial debates take place in the House of Commons it would be difficult to throw a handful of pebbles across the House without hitting a Conservative M. P. who has no economic interest in East or Central Africa.

There is little doubt that the present crisis in Nyasaland and the Rhodesias was created by the European leaders in order to anticipate the 1960 Conference. They were deeply disturbed by the success of the African All Peoples Conference held at Accra six months ago. The Europeans dread the example of independent Ghana and are aware that in 1960 Nigeria will become independent too. African leaders from the Federation were present at the Accra Conference and returned with an increased determination to gain their political freedom and with much earlier achievement of their aims in mind. Dr. Hastings Banda, the President of the Nyasaland African Congress, delivered a speech at the airport in Southern Rhodesia on his return from Accra which alarmed the White Settlers. In fact, the Accra Conference visualised a policy of non-violent resistance to European domination, but on the pressure of the Algerian delegates a sentence was added recognising that if European Governments prevented political advance and attempted to crush the peoples' movements by force, the people would be justified in retaliating by force. The European leaders in Central Africa pointed to this sentence as justification for their assertion that the African movements in the Federal area intended to resort to force.

The first act of suppression took place in Southern Rhodesia. The Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, acknowledged that there had been no violence. Indeed, the only clash that had occurred had been during a strike at the Kariba Dam, where the African workers, paid fourpence a day, asked for one shilling a day as danger money after fourteen Africans and three Europeans had fallen to their deaths from a scaffolding. The Government immediately rushed in troops and the strike was broken. Even there no violence had taken place. The declaration of a State of Emergency was justified as an anticipation of disturbances, not in the Rhodesias, but in Nyasaland.

The Governments of Nyasaland and Britain have asserted that Dr. Hastings Banda and the Nyasaland African Congress planned the massacre and murder of Europeans, Asians and "moderate" Africans in that territory. A Commission is now investigating the truth of this matter, but I am confident that Dr. Banda and the Congress were not committed to any such plan. Undoubtedly they were thinking of civil disobedience on the Indian model. They were frustrated by the delays in constitutional reform which would mean that they would be unrepresented at the 1960 Conference. The evidence of the massacre plot, it is now known, was provided by paid informers, persons who had been expelled from the Congress and alleged girl-friends of some of the leaders. I think it possible that a desperate group of Africans, outside the Congress, were thinking of adopting Mau Mau methods in Nyasaland, but this was no reason for suppressing Congress and arresting and deporting its leaders. The fact that not a single European or Asian has been killed, although many of them live isolated in large African communities, proves that massacre could not have been seriously contemplated. The only persons killed have been fifty-three Africans, who died as victims of shooting by security forces introduced from Southern Rhodesia.

The Africans of all the three territories, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, are determined to end the European-dominated Federation. The people of Nyasaland would prefer to be federated with Tanganyika and perhaps Uganda, which are well on the way to becoming African States. The Africans of Northern Rhodesia wish to become an independent state, freed from European domination. The Africans of Southern Rhodesia are aware that the dissolution of Federation might mean that their European masters would seek to associate the country with the Union of South Africa, but deliberately they have come to the conclusion that their best hope, as well as the hope of the coloured peoples in South Africa, lies in the advance of independence in their neighbouring countries and throughout the Continent.

The most significant fact in Africa is the growth of a feeling of solidarity among the peoples of the whole continent. The events which are moving towards a crisis in 1960 cannot leave the rest of Africa unaffected. Already we have seen the revolt in the Belgian Congo which has led to concessions by the Belgian Government. France has had to go far in recognising the rights of the peoples in West and Equatorial Africa, one third of the whole continent, to internal self-government. The peoples will soon sweep beyond the present concessions which European Governments are making. This movement for liberation has been stimulated not only by the Peoples Conference at Accra but by the call which the independent Governments of Ghana and Guinea have now made for a union of all the African independent states and their united pressure for freedom throughout the Continent.

This African Revolution represents the greatest dynamic change of our time. It is the duty of Socialists in Europe and in all parts of the world to identify themselves with it and to support it by all the political means which are within their power.



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## Nuclear Energy in Yugoslavia

by Milorad RISTIĆ

Yugoslavia is a pioneer country in the field of nuclear physics and energy, both from the standpoint of its contribution to the general development of these sciences and of the early date it began work in this sphere.

The work of Irene Joliot-Curie and Pavle Savić figures prominently in the dramatic developments that took place in the scientific laboratories of many countries during 1938 and 1939 and provided the final confirmation that fission of the atom nucleus, which was hitherto considered indivisible, is possible. This discovery marked the beginning of the great Atomic Age. Only three years later, in December 1942, after building the first nuclear reactor, Enrico Fermi accomplished the first controlled chain reaction of uranium atomic nuclei, thus practically enabling the liberation of undreamed of quantities of energy. The next three years led to the first ominous application of nuclear energy. The first three A bombs were exploded in 1945 and revealed the imponderable possibilities inherent in the new source of energy. The speed with which this scientific discovery passed from the laboratories to practical exploitation is unparalleled in the history of science.

Realizing the enormous significance of this discovery for the further development of productive forces and the prosperity of mankind in general, Yugoslavia immediately began the implementation of a programme aimed at the creation of the necessary material and technical basis which would enable our country to take an active part in the development and exploitation of the new source of energy. It was thus decided in 1947 to begin the construction of the first Yugoslav centre for nuclear studies, which was duly initiated the following year, when the foundations of the present Nuclear Research Institute in Vinča near Belgrade were laid. The Institute was named after Boris Kidrič, thus symbolizing the share of the late Yugoslav leader in the fulfillment of this task.

The construction of the "Boris Kidrič" Institute in Vinča was followed by that of two similar institutes, the "Jozef Stefan" research centre in Ljubljana and the "Rudjer Bošković" in Zagreb. Besides, large scale uranium prospecting schemes were developed.

The assembly and installation of the special instruments and apparatus was begun in the newly-created institutes, thus providing adequate practical training for the young research workers. This was followed immediately by the installation of the heavier research equipment and apparatus, such as the 1.5 million volt accelerator in Vinča etc. This stage of work was marked by serious difficulties, primarily because this branch of science was entirely new in Yugoslavia, so that an experienced research staff was lacking. Moreover, we were obliged to work in more or less complete isolation, as all activities in this field were subject to security controls in all countries, so that the most important data were considered top secret.

The period from 1952 to 1954 was marked at first by modest and later on by ever stronger links between the young Yugoslav nuclear scientists and their colleagues at foreign universities and other research centres. At that time a particularly strong tendency among scientists to establish mutual ties was noticeable, especially in the small countries which were not

aligned in any of the political or military blocs, and which do not intend to apply nuclear energy for military purposes. Apart from this, the general political climate favoured the relaxation of security controls in the field of nuclear energy, this trend being further enhanced by the development of research work in small countries which were under no obligation whatever in this respect. At that time Yugoslav experts could be found in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, France, Belgium and other countries, where they studied various problems in the field of nuclear physics, biology and electronics. The firm resolve of Yugoslavia to begin concrete work aiming at the practical use of nuclear energy prompted several Yugoslav scientists to specialize in the study of nuclear reactors. The construction of a nuclear reactor by our own resources was also contemplated, thus following the example of Norway and Sweden, which built their own reactors immediately after France, and adopted a steadfast course towards the exploitation of nuclear energy for industrial purposes.

The gradual acquisition of independence by the Yugoslav research workers was also noticeable at that time, as they began devoting increasing attention to the specific Yugoslav problems in this domain, provided original solutions and made discoveries. The Bulletin of the Vinča Nuclear Research Institute became a regular publication with ever higher standards. The need for new equipment and investments was growing steadily. It was in such a situation that the Federal Nuclear Commission was formed in 1954, with the task of coordinating and channelling all Yugoslav activities in this sphere.

The development of nuclear energy in the international sphere also registered a turning point at that time. The first international conference for the peacetime application of nuclear energy was held in Geneva in 1955, under the auspices of the United Nations. A wealth of scientific information, previously guarded as top secret, was released on that occasion. At the same time the USA and the USSR published their programmes of assistance to other countries for the purpose of developing their own activities in the nuclear sphere. The possibility of obtaining reactors, special instruments, materials etc., from various sources required a revision of the Yugoslav views and plans. It was soon decided to purchase a nuclear reactor which would enable the further development of our nuclear research institutes, this time along the precisely defined road of the utilization of nuclear energy in science and industry. The studies made showed that it would be most suitable to purchase in the USSR a heavy water reactor with 2 per cent enriched uranium with an installed power of 7,000 KWH. This reactor would correspond best to the conditions set by the Yugoslav plans and requirements. A Yugoslav-Soviet Agreement on scientific cooperation and technical assistance was therefore signed at the end of 1955. This instrument also provided for the delivery of a nuclear reactor. There was no such reactor in Europe at the time which would equal this device in power and experimental versatility, and even at present this reactor is one of the most advanced apparatus of this type.

Ground work for the installation of the reactor was begun on the premises of the "Boris Kidrič" Institute in Vinča in the second half of 1956. The reactor was installed in 1958. The

blueprints and essential equipment were purchased in the USSR while the construction and general plans were drawn up by the Yugoslav experts. The remaining equipment was partly supplied by the Yugoslav factories and partly imported from the West. The new reactor is expected to come into operation soon.

Several new laboratories are also being built in Vinča, parallel with the new reactor, whose purpose is both the exploitation of the reactor and the development of the fundamental branches of science pertaining to the development, design and construction of nuclear reactors in general and power generating reactors in particular. The first Yugoslav experimental reactor with minimum installed power (the so-called Zero reactor) came into operation in one of these laboratories last year. The seven MW nuclear reactor in Vinča and the cyclotron in Zagreb which is nearing the final stages of assembly, are two important research apparatus which also confront our nuclear scientists with many new tasks. Moreover, the reactor, with its enormous and complex research capacity, will exert a vast influence on the solution of existing problems in the field of nuclear research in Yugoslavia.

This fact was realized by the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission, which began drafting a longterm programme for the development of nuclear energy in Yugoslavia two years ago. The general directives for the development of nuclear reactors have now been adopted. These directives constitute the nucleus of all other activity of the Federal Commission, such as the supply of nuclear raw materials and equipment, protection from irradiation, electronics, biology, physics, physical chemistry etc.

The directives define the prospects of Yugoslav nuclear energy for the coming 10 to 15 year period. They are preceded by an analysis of the state and needs of the Yugoslav science and economy in connection with nuclear energy. The most general conclusions are as follows:

So far Yugoslav activities in the field of nuclear energy have been developed exclusively within the national nuclear institutes and aimed primarily at training the necessary staff. This stage of development is best illustrated by the broad range of scientific branches and problems dealt with in our nuclear research institutes.

The share in national income of the resources invested in nuclear energy is still notably below the share of these investments in the national income of other countries. Needless to say, as the Yugoslav national income is both relatively and absolutely speaking, fairly small by comparison with the big powers, the total funds available are also modest, as are the results.

Although these funds have been invested globally so far and without any definite channelling, at the present stage it is necessary to begin investments aiming at the fulfilment of definite tasks put forward by the economic situation and requirements of the country. It is therefore necessary to utilize the modest resources available as rationally as possible.

It should be mentioned in this connection that nuclear engineering, is no new and independent branch of technical science. Nuclear engineering is only a new field for the application of all branches of conventional engineering. The development of nuclear engineering consequently implies the rise of all branches of conventional engineering and technology to the highest possible level.

There is still no definite view concerning the economic requirements of our country in nuclear energy, but it is considered as certain that the hydroelectric potential will be more or less exhausted during the period between 1980 and 1990 while the growth of consumption would be covered by new thermal plants. The coal reserves are so vast that, for the next thirty years at least, there can be no shortage which would render the exploitation of new energy sources, such as nuclear power, imperative. In view of the low calorie content of Yugoslav coal and the rapid rise of power consumption, the estimates show that the economic exhaustion of hydroelectric water-power sources must be expected earlier, and that various economic factors will require the exploitation of nuclear energy between 1970 and 1980.

The draft development plan of nuclear energy is therefore already being considered today. This plan aims primarily at preparation and training by 1970 or 1975 of an adequate technical staff, which will be in a position to design and build the future nuclear power stations in Yugoslavia. This programme would provide for research work, engineering, industrial development and adequate educational preparation.

## Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the C.P.Y.

# Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Munich Agreement

by Slobodan MIRIĆ

MARCH 1938 saw Nazi troops march into Austria unopposed, even though the powers which had signed the Saint Germain Agreement had guaranteed that country's independence and integrity. Great Britain and France lodged only formal protests with Hitler's government via their ambassadors in Germany, and a month later also they officially recognized Austria's "union" with Germany.

Then it came Czechoslovakia's turn. In the wake of preludes that bespoke a constant growth of Hitler's appetites, and capitulation on the part of the Western powers, on September 29 and 30, 1938 the representatives of Great Britain,

France, Italy and Germany signed, in Munich, an Agreement ordering Czechoslovakia to cede immediately Sudetenland to Germany as well as the frontier belt facing Austria. Beside simultaneously it was suggested to Czechoslovakia to regularize also the territorial claims of Poland and Hungary.

The new leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia headed by Josip Broz Tito, which had been formed at the end of 1937, did not remain, nor could it remain, passive in the face of those events on the international stage, and in the immediate vicinity of Yugoslav borders. Establishing the indisputable fact that fascism spells the greatest danger to

the Yugoslav people at the given moment, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia immediately started on preparations whose ultimate aim was to organize the defence of the country in event of a fascist attack.

Envisioning that the aggressive Nazi plans would mainly follow the familiar lines of advance of German imperialism from the times of Bismarck and the First World War („Drang nach Osten“), the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had been issuing warnings at the time of the Austrian occupation already that „the route leads beyond, across Yugoslavia, to the Aegean Sea.“ Pointing out that in this Hitler was enjoying the support and assistance of the other fascist power, Italy, which for a long time has made no secret of its own designs to occupy the western parts of Yugoslavia, including Dalmatia, Bosnia and a part of Slovenia, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia issued a proclamation to the people of Yugoslavia in connection with the *Anschluss* calling their attention to the grave threat facing them with the arrival of Hitler's troops on Yugoslav borders. This danger, in the appraisal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, was magnified by the fact that the then Yugoslav Government was already distinguishing itself by anti-democratic attitudes. It was headed by Milan Stojadinović, a pronounced supporter of fascist policies, who for a long time before had tried with all forces to detach Yugoslavia from her former allies and turn her into an adjunct of the fascist powers. A series of foreign-political actions which the Stojadinović government had carried out precedently had influenced a considerable weakening of the anti-fascist front of European countries. The Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia) had been broken up; a „Pact of Eternal Friendship“ had been concluded with Bulgaria; violations of international treaties and commitments on the part of the Axis powers were overtly upheld.

Because of this, one of the essential conditions for a successful resistance to fascism, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia emphasized, was overthrow of the Stojadinović government and establishment of a government of national defence which would be capable of organizing the country's defence.

The proclamation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia relating to the *Anschluss* said this, *inter alia*:

„Hitlerite troops are on the borders of Yugoslavia!

Fascist, pan-Germanic and conquest-seeking Germany is coming to border on Yugoslavia. Hitlerism is not „a friend and good neighbour,“ but the sworn enemy of the freedom and independence of Yugoslavia...“

„Yesterday Hitler's soldiery trampled on the freedom of the Austrian people, today they are already preparing to strike at brotherly Czechoslovakia, and tomorrow his troops will break into Yugoslavia across the Karavanke mountains.“

The Czechoslovak crisis did not take Yugoslav Communists by surprise. They saw in those developments a logical continuance of the policy of betrayal of little peoples' interests. In connection with the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had not only resolutely reacted, by way of fresh proclamations and leaflets, to the growing danger threatening Yugoslavia and all the remaining little nations of Europe, but had undertaken also a series of other tangible measures aimed at bridle aggression in good time. Despite the difficult conditions of underground work, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia recorded significant successes in organizing the enlistment of volunteers for defence of Czechoslovakia, over 60,000 Yugoslav citizens responding to the appeal of the Communist Party to defend the independence of that friendly country. Those were primarily men whom the Party had taught in those fateful days to prize the freedom of other friendly peoples the same

as their own. At numerous meetings held throughout the country under the slogan „We Shall Defend Czechoslovakia!“, the solidarity of Yugoslav Communists and anti-fascists with the Czechoslovak people in the worst days of its history was being voiced. „If need be, the first battalions of volunteers will go to the defence of democratic Czechoslovakia from this very University!“ were the words pronounced at one of the many solemn meetings held at the University of Beograd, words providing a convincing example of the mood the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had promoted among the people. That those were not mere empty words was testified by the many hundreds of Yugoslav volunteers who had fought also in the trenches of the Republican forces of Spain against the same enemy — German and Italian fascism and Franco's falangae.

In its efforts to unite all the positive democratic forces of Yugoslavia on a wide political platform of defence of the country's independence, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had been creating a powerful united anti-fascist front which was being joined in ever-larger numbers by individuals and groups from the political parties of the opposition.

The line of assistance to the Czechoslovak people to resist Nazi aggression which was so perseveringly and successfully pursued by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the time of the Munich Agreement and the Czechoslovak crisis had formed part of the consistent anti-fascist attitude of Yugoslav Communists which so brilliantly manifested itself during the armed struggle of Yugoslav Partisans against the fascist invaders in the course of the People's Revolution from 1941—45.

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# Agricultural Development in Yugoslavia

## (Excerpts from the Opening Speech by E. Kardelj)

*At the beginning of May a Plenum of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade, at which the opening speech and report on policy in the countryside was made by Edvard Kardelj, the Secretary-General of SAWPY. We give here excerpts from his opening speech, which was devoted to the most important questions of principle in the development of socialist relations in the countryside and the promotion of agricultural production:*

### A SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE WITH MODERN SOCIAL METHODS OF PRODUCTION IS ALONE ECONOMICALLY SOUND

EXPERIENCE has shown that we may consider as economically justified, sound and capable of all-round progress only that socialist economic organization in agriculture which relies on modern technology and is capable of using modern social methods of production on the basis of such technology, i.e., where the social character of the work arises, not only from more or less forced working co-operation, but from the very character of the technical methods which are imposed by modern production. Of course, internal social-economic relations must also be gradually attuned to such development. Accordingly, the problem of land unification or transforming land ownership now exists — since agrarian reform has done away, not only with large estates, but also with estates of rural magnates, kulaks, and rural bourgeoisie, and reduced individual estates to medium-sized rural estates — only to such an extent and in such a sense as to provide the gradual expansion of modern technical methods on the basis of social basic means of agricultural production.

Such a method is imposed all the more as the investment of social means is necessary in any case if we wish to achieve considerable results in agriculture. Backward, privately-owned farms such as exist in our country — even if collectivized — are unable as they are to provide sufficient funds for a complete and fundamental reconstruction of the technical basis of our agriculture. But by investing social means and by their application to individual holdings, which will lead to the greater mobilization of their means, the social community becomes more and more capable of directing the economic and social processes in the countryside.

Unification and communalization of land — in a country with backward agriculture, as ours still is — can thus be approached in two ways, by two methods: by a general collectivization of land on the basis of a simple work co-operation, with the prospect of a gradual technical reconstruction of agriculture; or by investing social funds, through the corresponding forms of co-operative organization, in modern means of production, with corresponding methods of land unification, together with an increase in the volume and economic rôle of these basic means in agricultural production.

We decided on the second method because, first, this method provides a steady increase in production and in productivity — which is shown already by results analyzed in the following sections of this report — and, second, because it corresponds to the direct material interest of the farmers, and therefore is also politically more suitable.

In labelling as „revisionist” this attitude, which, I repeat, refers only to the method and not to the socialist aim of our policy, critics of some countries use the argument that we are directly repudiating Marx, who indicates the great socio-historical importance of simple work co-operation. It is true that Marx wrote about this in „Das Kapital” and elsewhere, but it is not true that discussion on modern collectivization has any connection with the subject treated by Marx. For he treats the socio-historical importance of simple work co-operation in primitive conditions of production, and especially in connection with the beginnings of capitalist manufacture. That was the period when fresh capital, destroying the private ownership of feudal times and expropriating independent craftsmen, set up large workshops in which technological methods of production did not differ essentially from those of the independent craftsman, but where a certain work co-operation in individual stages of production was already possible. From such original simple work co-operation more developed forms of communal work actually giving the form of the modern capitalist society have gradually developed on the basis of more advanced technology. It was the beginning of a historical process, the beginning of capitalism, and of the period when mankind was just on the threshold of those great technical discoveries which later caused the industrial revolution in Europe.

Today we are living in quite different times. To speak in our present conditions of the building of socialism with the primitive work co-operation based on the hoe and draft horse, or at best with the few tractors and combines, and not to take account of the fact that a revolutionary leap forward has been made in modern agricultural technique and technology, would be just as if we were to industrialize the country on the basis of craft co-operatives. Besides, it should not be forgotten that capitalist development in our villages for 150 years firmly „territorialized” the farmer and taught him to think only through the medium of economic calculations, and that therefore he is not ready to accept easily collectivist recipes which do not convince him economically. For such a farmer collectivization is just the same as expropriation. That is why such a method would create an open conflict between the socialist state and the working farmer in our country.

There are situations, however, in which general political conditions, i. e., internal or external relations of class or political forces, can impose methods of general collectivization on the basis of simple work co-operation on a socialist country. This is especially valid in cases when the economic force of socialist factors is not sufficient to check the development of capitalist tendencies, which inevitably arise from the uncontrolled actions of small landowners. In such conditions direct state material control over economic methods in the countryside is a historical inevitability as a condition of the survival of the socialist state. Collectivization becomes the economic form of setting up that control. This was the case with collectivization in the USSR, and to a great extent also in the Chinese communes today.

This relates to a certain extent even to the historical rôle of our collectivization through working co-operatives after

8. From the economic point of view it failed. But the fact is that as a result of this action and the measures taken at the time of the reorganization of working co-operatives, roots of capitalism in our countryside were definitely located.

We will not consider why the Soviet Union needed such collectivization as they adopted. It would be nonsense to say that their path was completely wrong and ours completely right. As I have already stressed, it is not only economic and political reasons that are decisive in the settling of such problems. It is also affected by the internal and international political situation. That is why we do not intend to embark on a hypothetical analysis of what might have happened in the USSR if there had been no collectivization. But we know very well what would have happened in our country if we had embarked on bureaucratic adventures by the setting up of a state monopoly in agricultural production under the guise of collectivization.

So when we refer to figures, in the later sections of this article, on agricultural development in socialist countries, and the negative aspects of particular methods, we are not doing so in order to condemn *en bloc* collectivization, or even just Chinese communes, but in order to repel attempts to impose on us, in the name of Marxism and Leninism, those methods of socialist transformation of the countryside which are not appropriate to our conditions or our times, and which could therefore inevitably lead to economic failure and unavoidable political consequences in our country. Failures in agricultural development in a number of People's Democracies is a convincing justification of this attitude.

If one ignores the political side of the problem in judging collectivization and keeps exclusively to the field of the economic data, it is not possible to explain why collectivization of the Stalinist type in a certain historical period became a practice in some socialist countries, and was long continued in spite of its obvious economic weaknesses. But it is less a mistake when those people transform into a dogma a particular and historically conditioned political method of Stalinist action, without seeing its negative side as well. It is a fact that owing to the lack of development of the means of production and the low productivity, the survival of the organizations based on simple work co-operation depends on state control. Like every system based on administrative control and political stimulation, collectivization of the Stalinist type demands ultimate centralization of management. But administrative centralization is accompanied by all other negative factors such as bureaucracy, isolation of the managing leadership from practical needs, impossibility of accepting individual initiative in the organization of production and methods, insufficient material concern shown by the producer, unreliability of control and inspection, which must all have an unfavourable influence on productivity.

Besides, when such relations are once set up, they develop their own logic and create a certain consciousness. They are reluctant to interfere, even when the society is already capable of investing and when it is actually applying new production techniques to such economic organizations. The existing economic relations which have been overcome objectively by the development of production forces prevent the full application of new techniques, and oppose the programme for the promotion of the production if it is constructed on the basis of technocratic plans which do not take into account economic relations in which living people find themselves. Only when these economic relations are changed — which is already beginning to happen in the USSR — does the attitude of the producers also begin to change towards techniques and technological methods which might lead to greater productivity.

So we must consider the original forms of collectivization at best as a historical necessity in the conditions of relative economic and political weakness of socialist fac-

tors, and not as a necessary phase in the development of socialism.

But regardless of the political necessity of certain methods and means in the socialist transformation of agriculture, the fact remains that only by concrete economic results can the economic efficacy of that method be judged. Thus the question arises as to whether the same method should be applied in a different situation when the same political factors are no longer present or should one condemn oneself to serious economic failures without any practical reason, just to satisfy a dogmatic idea. It is quite clear that this would be senseless.

#### THE PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION THROUGH MODERN AGRICULTURAL METHODS AND THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE ARE TWO ASPECTS OF A SINGLE PROCESS

BUT if we discard such a dogma, this does not mean in the least that we are against every move towards the socialist transformation of the countryside, with which some of our critics abroad reproach us. This means only that we are solving this task in close connection with the task of increasing production, increasing productivity, reducing production costs, in a word, with the general promotion of agricultural production, in accordance with the material means at the disposal of society. We consider that in our conditions it is possible to connect these two tasks, and that such an action in the long run is the quickest road to socialism in the countryside, even if figures regarding percentages of collectivized land do not correspond to those in some other socialist countries. Just for this reason we firmly hold the view that the promotion of agricultural production through modern agricultural methods and the socialist transformation of the countryside are two aspects of a single process, and that only the co-ordination of both these processes may bring the expected results in both cases.

For all these reasons we are not in favour of a campaign of unification and collectivization of land, but of a concrete association of the socialist units with the farmer — on the basis of mutual material interests, — which corresponds to the existing scale of modern means for production. On this idea is also based our conception of the complex construction of those co-operatives which have the greatest chance of success. This is the road which means the conquest of land step by step for modern large-scale socialist production, which should immediately give high yields and high productivity. Every new success on this road will be an additional convincing example for everybody, and will absorb ever wider areas in the process of promoting agriculture, so that each step forward in the socialist transformation of the countryside will become easier and, from the economic point of view, cheaper and more profitable.

The complex equipment of a co-operative or agricultural estate in this sense, of course, does not mean equipment for the production of everything, but the complete equipment of a certain technological process with techniques and other means, so that it may give the planned productive results. This means the raising of agriculture to the level of industrial production. It means that technical methods in agriculture are approaching more and more to the precision of technical methods in industry.

It is quite clear that such progress will most quickly set in motion first, all the reserves which still exist on the individual rural estates in the sense of intensifying the general struggle for greater production and productivity and, second, a greater desire on the part of the farmers towards co-operation in production with the socialist units; that is to say, it will speed up the process of the socialist transformation of the countryside and of agriculture.

But the logic of the dogmatic critics of our policy in the countryside is very simple. They say: collectivization as

we conceive it is the only possible socialism: you are against such collectivization, ergo you are against socialism.

That collectivization is only a political and economic form of the change in relations in the countryside and in no way a definite ideal of socialist relations, and that it is therefore linked with a particular time and particular relations, critics of that type do not even want to hear. They also cannot even imagine that in other circumstances and in other times more direct and, from the point of view of socio-political relation, less painful methods may be applied. They forget that socialism is not this or that method, but that socialism means a definite relation between people within the framework of social methods of work, which has been made possible by a certain degree of development of the productive forces and a certain degree of collectivization of the means of production. If we were not to take into account this close mutual connection between the nature of the means of production and relations in production, our ideal would become the primitive "socialism" of a patriarchal rural community. This primitive "socialism", however, has long ago been destroyed by capitalism and the privately owned estate, not so much by outside force as by the greater productivity which they introduced. If we wish to replace privately owned estates by socialist estates today, then they must become still more productive.

## CONCLUSIONS about the further Implementation of a Socialist Policy in the Village

Meeting under the chairmanship of President Tito, the 9th Plenum of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia was held on May 5 and 6, in Beograd. The Plenum, at which the Secretary General of the Alliance, Edvard Kardelj, acted as Rapporteur, adopted the following conclusions at the end of its work.

THE PLENUM of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, held on May 5 and 6, 1959, notes, on the basis of the report and discussion, that our rural policy has proved correct, that it has been contributive to initiation of an extensive social-political and economic activity in the village and that it has rendered possible the realization of significant results in the promotion of our agricultural production and its socialist transformation. In adopting the report on "The Problems of Socialist Policy in the Village", which was submitted by comrade Edvard Kardelj, and on the basis of discussion, the Plenum of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia indicates the prospects and tasks for the coming period in the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. The future harmonious development of productive forces and a successful development and consolidation of socialist social relations in our country in general depends also on the pace of development of agricultural production and the establishment of new economic relations in our villages.

In 1956 already, on the basis of the resolutions which were issued at that time by the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the 4th Plenum of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, major changes were effected in our economic policy. In pursuing this policy, a special significance was attached to a quicker development and modernization of agriculture.

The agricultural production realized during the last years, which exceeded the level of the prewar and post-war averages, the increased productivity of labour in agriculture notably on large farms and in Co-operation, confirm the correctness of our course and the forms of socialist transformation of agriculture. Thanks to this, real possibilities exist to realize the major production tasks relating to agriculture comprised in the Five Year Plan, ahead of schedule, which will decisively influence an improvement of the payment balance.

Besides by increased investments of social resources, fundamental factors of our successes in agriculture are represented by the economic system and the relations which are built on State Agricultural Farms and in Co-operative organizations; they have given a strong impetus to the interest and initiative of each individual worker and entire collectives for the introduction of new technological processes and increasing production. This has also made strengthening of Co-operatives and their ever-larger influence on production.

The clearly established policy of socialist reconstruction of agriculture, which has opened fresh prospects of development, has made possible the necessary unity of action of all the economic and political organizations and forces.

With their activity, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia and other social-political organizations have contributed to engagement on this common task of all factors which are able to influence social-economic movement in agriculture.

The place and rôle of the State Administration in efforts for the promotion of agriculture have been built in accordance with the foundations of our economic system.

A specially significant function has been that of chambers of agriculture, Co-operative Unions and other agricultural organizations and trade associations, as well as of the agricultural technical services.

The economic interestedness of the working collectives, agricultural organizations and each producer has been decisively contributive in arousing interest for the application of modern technological processes. This has made for a constant expansion and intensification of initiative in our agriculture for increasing productivity of labour and strengthening expanding socialist relations. All this shows that modern technology can afford full results only in particular socio-economic relations. With this auspicious conditions have been created for a wide application of the most modern technological processes in agricultural production.

The results marked in the promotion of agriculture which results make possible a constant increase of the rural income, a high level of employment of the rural population outside of agriculture and an augmented participation of rural income from non-agricultural activities, the growth and modified structure of consumption, the price policy of farm products which stimulates production, as well as those measures which are implemented in the sphere of raising the standard of living, and notably the building of the communal system — have caused a majority of the peasantry to become an active factor in the social life of the country and a strong support of our political system.

### ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND ACTION IN AGRICULTURE ARE BASED ON VOLUNTARINESS AND THE ECONOMIC INTEREST OF THE WORKING PEASANT

OF CRUCIAL importance for such a positive development in the village is the fact that our socialist structures, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia have been absolute and consistent in promoting such forms and actions in agriculture which were based on voluntariness and economic interest of the working peasant.

The purpose of our policy still remains: reconstruction of agriculture in the direction of creating large socialist producing units capable of organizing, on the basis of modern techniques and scientific developments, the social work process accompanied by a gradual socialization of lands. The results we have recorded thus far along that line indicate that for us this constitutes the best and the only possible course of socialist reconstruction of agriculture safeguarding quick production increase, creation of the necessary food stocks, cheap raw materials for our industry and a sufficient quantity of products for an essential strengthening of our country's position in foreign trade. This simultaneously makes for an essential improvement of the living conditions of the working people in the towns as well as the quickest emancipation of a majority of our rural population from backwardness.

The stepped-up development of agriculture on this basis will influence essentially a more co-ordinated and quicker development of the economy integrally, it will make for elimination of the existing disparity and strengthen the general economic possibilities of our country.

The social-economic interests of Yugoslavia's development demand that, in the future also, there be safeguarded high annual rate of increase of agricultural production on the basis of increased investments, utilization of reserves, as well as the interestedness of the producers for the application of modern technological processes on the largest scale".

#### THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CONSTANT ASCENDANT OF THE INDUSTRIES SAFEGUARDING ITS SUPPLY AND THE PROCESSING OF ITS PRODUCTS

MODERNIZATION of agriculture can be successfully promoted provided that the development is constantly attached and encouraged of all those branches of industry which serve to safeguard its supply and the processing of its products. In this way agriculture will increasingly be incorporated in the system of social division of labour, which will increase productivity of labour and a higher income. This degree of general economic development reached thus far makes possible such a course and a higher rate of increase of agricultural production.

Increased agricultural production demands a further development of transport and modernization of commerce, as well as the undertaking of appropriate measures on the part of all economic organizations in expanding the market and successfully realizing the products. Because of this, agricultural organizations, too, must engage themselves more directly toward the promotion of all those activities which will be contributive to an even more successful development of agriculture.

Modern agricultural production can only be promoted in the forms of a socialistically organized major production on the basis of modern means of production. Progress in increasing agricultural production will be realized all the quicker in so far as our socialist organizations will safeguard, on economic bases, an expanded application of new and modern technological processes, overcoming the obstacles represented along this line by the petty individual holding.

For realization of the established aims of socialist reconstruction and modernization of agriculture, it is indispensable to safeguard:

— a continued rapid development of State Agricultural Farms, Peasant Work Co-operatives and Co-operative Farms, expansion of their areas, their fitting and equipping for achievement of high yields and a constant increase of productivity of labour and income, so that in the process of development they may be reaching the level of productivity of industry;

— a continued economic and organizational strengthening and technical equipment and fitting of Co-operatives, so that they may promote the most successfully producing co-operation with individual peasants on the basis of high yields, an increased productivity of labour and a higher income. This will make for the further economic strengthening of Co-operatives and improvement of the living conditions of the working peasants. In this a significant element will be represented also by stimulation of those forms of Co-operative team-work as well which will mobilize the reserves on individual peasant holdings on the basis of Co-operative and other local funds.

A stronger influence of socialist producing organizations on the market, accompanied by lower production costs, inevitably will consolidate and further encourage the orientation of individual peasant holdings toward modern production, engendering their more and more extensive team-work with Co-operatives and State Agricultural Farms. Co-operation should be promoted as a component part of our efforts for increased production, higher yields and a larger productivity of labour. Thus conceived of, co-operation may become that necessary transitional form of socialist transformation of agriculture".

#### CO-OPERATION CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS FOR SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGE

ANY FORM of producing co-operation of economic organizations (State Agricultural Farms, Peasant Work Co-operatives, General Agricultural Co-operatives and their farms, their economic organizations in industry and commerce) with individual peasant holdings which brings and promotes the elements of socialization of the production process is to be regarded as socialist co-operation in agricultural production. Co-operation constitutes one of the fundamental factors in our efforts for socialist reconstruction of the village. It must be based on the both-sided interest of the peasants and Co-operatives or other economic organizations. Such a course in the promotion of agriculture will intensify the interest of the working peasant to increase production and productivity of labour; on such a basis the conditions will be created for a constant improvement of this standard of living. Consistent implementation of the principle of voluntariness and recognition of rental will contribute more and more to an active inclusion of the working peasant into the process of socialist transformation of agriculture.

Integration and grouping of larger areas of agricultural land, which is the condition for an efficacious application of modern techniques and a modern organization of work and production, will be solved by co-operation and expansion of the areas of socialist agricultural organizations with the aid of purchases, longer-term leasing of lands and bringing idle areas under cultivation, then by obtaining new areas through reclamation, by cultivating the areas of meadows and pastures, by clearing brushwood and similar undertakings".

#### STRIVING FOR CONSTANT CUTS IN PRODUCTION COSTS

IN ORDER that State Agricultural Farms, Work Co-operatives and farms and their co-operation with individual peasants may become a decisive factor in agricultural production and on the market, it is necessary that they continue promoting the organization of work and production, that they pass more quickly to specialization, that they keep raising productivity and strive for constant cuts in production costs. By the investment policy and other economic measures, such a development of socialist holdings should be promoted as will enable them the most successfully to utilize all the potential reserves for purposes of increasing production.

Remuneration on the basis of yield in production and/or per unit of product has proved on socialist holdings as the most stimulative system. It is therefore necessary that in all agricultural organizations and Co-operatives the income of the workers be realized by a larger part on the basis of the yields achieved, as well as on the basis of the over-all operations of the organizations. Such a distribution and remuneration will give an even stronger impetus to individual initiative and the economic interest of the producers".

#### THE MATERIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CO-OPERATIVES SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO THE MAXIMUM

IT IS necessary to continue developing General Agricultural Co-operatives as the most massive organizations of socialist transformation of agriculture in our petty-ownership village. For this, it is necessary to create as strong a material basis as possible for Co-operatives.

Development of Co-operative farms will contribute to the further self-assertion of Co-operatives as the organizers of a more modern agricultural production and a more and more extensive team-work of Co-operatives with individual peasants.

The system of management in Co-operatives should constantly be adjusted to the economic relations promoted in them and to their collaboration with the peasants. It is necessary to pay special attention to the promotion and to an even larger participation of the working collectives in the management of Co-operatives and Co-operative works.

It is necessary to give continued encouragement to the development of business associations of Co-operatives, State Agricultural Farms and economic organizations concerned in the field of agriculture. These associations, viz., business unions, will develop as independent associations of the producing organizations which founded them. Investments of social resources must be made primarily where they will yield the most advantageous economic results and step up the development of a large-scale production. In this it is necessary to ensure such an allocation of social resources to central and local funds and such an integration thereof as to safeguard the most successful development of productive forces.

One of the fundamental tasks in the promotion of agriculture is to cut down production costs per unit of product. Application of modern means, a constant perfecting of the distribution of the income of agricultural organizations and the system of remuneration constitute the indispensable conditions for realization of a high productivity of labour and a mass production. All our economic measures — the price policy, the credit and investment policies, the policy of subsidies, and so on — should encourage agricultural organizations in the direction of the most profitable operations and the lowest production costs per unit of product.

The regulative measures of the state should act as harmoniously as possible toward the further development of production and the relations in the sphere of agriculture. These measures should serve to regulate the internal relations and movements of socialist economic factors, as well as to abolish or fetter capitalist tendencies or private-ownership speculation at the expense of social interests".

#### MEASURES FOR GUIDING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN THE VILLAGE

**A**MONG the measures which should contribute to the guiding of economic and social movements in the village, the following should be emphasized in the first place:

— regulation of the conditions of utilization of agricultural lands, so that the most rational cultivation shall be safeguarded;

— utilization of hydrological reclamation systems on economic principles; the social resources invested should be

utilized as efficaciously as possible, safeguarding the material interest of the beneficiaries;

— introduction of adequate changes in the taxation system, so that it may correspond even more to the development of new economic relations in the village;

— the undertaking of further measures so that the credit system, so that it may correspond even to the development of a larger inclusion of individual producers into the socially-organized work process.

Socialist transformation of the village and promotion of agriculture demand the constant assistance of the communes, the districts, the republics and the Federation. The communes and districts will be able the most successfully to realize the tasks in agriculture primarily by fitting Co-operatives and other agricultural organizations for independent action toward the most efficacious promotion of productive forces by them. The People's Committees, notably the Councils of Producers, the other councils and the administrative organs should contribute to co-ordination of the programmes and action of all economic organizations on their territory, so that the policy of a People's Committee may be realized through them.

#### POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF THE VILLAGE

**A**SUCCESSFUL transformation of the village depends not only on the action of economic factors and the directive measures of state. In this an important function falls also to political and social organization. The forms of action in the village are manifold, given the fact that our social-economic system has created extensive possibilities in the village for the initiative of the working man on the basis of his own economic and social interest.

Our policy of socialist transformation of agriculture is founded on the economic prospects of the producers themselves. Any campaign and measures which failed to take account of the objective conditions, the social consciousness and the economic interests of the peasants would, perchance, arouse a feeling of insecurity and the resistance of the working peasantry. This would have a negative effect on our efforts to promote agriculture. Under our social conditions, the working peasant has become an equal social factor. As a result, any form of political pressure in the implementation of our rural policy would impede the initiative and activity of the masses, without which agriculture cannot be endowed with a modern, socialistically-organized production.

The principal task of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia is to encourage the participation of the working peasantry in socialist transformation. Upholding every form of socialist co-operation, it is necessary to assist in the first place, Co-operatives and other economic organizations which are becoming the organizers of production and the protagonists of modern technological processes in agriculture. It is necessary to intensify even more the participation and initiative of the commune in the implementation of our rural policy. The complex tasks of the construction of socialism in the village enjoin the organizations of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia to co-ordinate and integrate to the utmost the activity of all social organizations which are active in the village, so that, in their turn also, they may contribute as much as possible to realization of the immediate tasks and aims in the development of agriculture.

Trade Union organizations in the collectives of state Agricultural Farms and of Co-operatives should become a even stronger factor in the striving for socialist relations in the village, combatting the negative tendencies emanating from a still-insufficiently developed productive capacity.

It is necessary to keep including youth in the socialist transformation of the village, doing so in various forms and on an even wider scale. An intensified participation of youth

e life of the commune, in the Co-operative, and in the over-all social life, will make for an expansion of its participation in the realization of the general tasks of socialist rural polity.

By means of an intensified economic activity and promotion of social forms of production, which are increasingly changing the ways of the rural economy, possibilities are created for a larger influence of women in social life. Consequently it is necessary constantly to strengthen their participation in the work of Co-operatives and engage them in various forms of social production. On the basis of the augmented resources of the rural communes and personal income of the peasants, more possibilities will occur for creation of institutions and services which will make the life of the family of the agricultural producer easier.

The communes and districts must devote even more attention to the training of qualified personnel for agriculture. In this a special significance attaches to the various forms of extraschool education which, parallel with the modernization of production, must increasingly be built into a widespread and permanent system of education. More than before, it is necessary to engage also the resources of economic organizations and Co-operatives, so that the existing system of adult education, notably of young people from the rural districts, may be kept evolving in accordance with the constantly-growing needs of economic training of agricultural producers.

Cultural-educational action in the village should be directed more and more also toward an economic and technical education such as will enable our working peasantry the better to perceive its own position and actively to participate in the socialist transformation of the village. Modernization of agriculture and the promotion of new relations are creating fresh conditions for a quicker development of more modern forms of social life in the village, in which a larger engagement of the commune and other social factors is needed.

Special attention should be paid to the promotion and utilization of the press, of political, popular-technical and popular-scientific literature, the radio, films and other modern educational media.

Intensification of democratic relations and self-government in the Co-operative and in the village at large, co-ordination of the economic organizations with the policy of the communes and the social community and the interests of the working collectives and the working Peasantry belong among the fundamental tasks of our political organizations in the village. thereby, they will be contributing the most successfully to the socialist transformation of the village."

## ZUGOSLAVIA AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

STATEMENT BY KOĆA POPOVIĆ TO THE EDITOR OF TANJUG

*In connection with the forthcoming Geneva conference of Foreign Ministers of the big powers, scheduled for May 4, the foreign editor of "TANJUG" requested the Foreign Secretary, Koća Popović, to state his views on the subject. Mr Popović complied with this request and gave the following statement:*

THE KEEN interest of the world public in the Foreign Ministers' conference in Geneva is wholly understandable. All people expect that it will mark the beginning of the settlement of a series of difficult and intricate problems which are generally referred to as the "German problem". These issues which stem from World War II, have been further aggravated by the unfavourable development of postwar international re-

lations. As such they are both a consequence of the existing international tension and constitute a constant source of friction which has prevented the consolidation of the peace, particularly in this highly susceptible part of Europe. It is now obvious that such problems cannot be solved by imposing personal views by force, but only by means of negotiation and talks.

In view of the foregoing, the problems facing the participants in the Geneva conference are both complex and formidable, and it would therefore be unrealistic to expect that they can all be solved at the same time. The only way open to the participants in the conference is to arrive, at partial and gradual solutions, which would pave the way for a wider and more comprehensive settlement in the future. We do not deny that the problems on hand are interrelated to a certain extent, but we still consider that it would be harmful to make the settlement of one problem conditional on the solution of another. The setting of any priority whatever cannot, in our opinion, provide the basis for a settlement, but only render it still more difficult. It is no less evident that an appropriate solution can only be attained by means of mutual concessions, in other words, by the subjection of the narrower to the common interest, which is tantamount to the interests of peace. We are deeply convinced that here lies the essence and importance of negotiation, as it should enable — through the confrontation of attitudes, joint endeavour and readiness to overcome the existing differences — the reaching of those points in common which will open the way for a rapprochement of views and the elicitation of solutions.

Agreement to hold the conference in Geneva and organize future talks, including those at summit level and, eventually, other negotiations in itself marks a significant step forward, thus imposing still greater obligations upon the ministers who are about to convene in Geneva and the governments they represent.

As is known, the German problem is formulated at present under four points: Berlin, the peace treaty, unifications and European security (the creation of a limited armaments zone). We have already stated our views on the inter-relationship of these problems, and the negative effect of the imposing of any conditions or priority whatever.

It is evident that the occupation of Berlin has become the source of many undesirable consequences and dangers. An agreement on the modification of the present status would contribute greatly to the solution of the other problems. We consider that it is possible to devise a compromise solution acceptable to both sides, which would at least do away with the most negative effects ensuing from the present state of affairs. As many seem to realize at present, it is logical, within this context, to expect the Western de facto recognition of the existence of East Germany. In the same context we also consider that some ideas on the presence or participation of the United Nations in guaranteeing the new status of Berlin deserve serious consideration.

The Yugoslav government has, on several occasions, clearly stated its views concerning the problem of German unity. There can be no doubt that the prolonged division of Germany must have an adverse effect on the international situation. It seems, however, that all realistic observers agree at present that unification can only be brought about by a longer process.

The problem is too complex and involves too many interests on both sides to warrant a speedy solution. The existence of two German states with different social and political systems has become a reality which can obviously no longer be ignored. Yugoslavia has consistently adhered to the opinion that unification is primarily the concern of the German people themselves. We also consider, however, that the member-countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, primarily the four big powers, which are the most responsible for the post war development of the "German problem", are bound to facilitate and aid the process that when recognizing the existence of two German states, we

do not advocate the present division of Germany, but only consider it a concrete basis which should be taken as the starting point of any process leading to genuine unity. For all these reasons we are convinced that a realistic solution should be sought along lines of a confederation. Until then, any strengthening of contacts and co-operation between the two parts of Germany, primarily in these fields where there is mutual interest, can only accelerate this process.

In our Note of February 3, 1959 replying to the Note of the Soviet Government on this question, we stated our attitude with regard to the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Germany. We stated on that occasion that the conclusion of such a treaty would constitute an important step towards the regulation of international relations in Europe, and that it would not be desirable to make it conditional on the settlement of other issues which do not bear upon it directly. I would wish to add, however, that setting of rigid priority could only have a negative effect. The substance of such an agreement is extremely complex and involves many outstanding points. If and when agreement is reached, it is not important under what "title" it will be proclaimed. The fact that no peace treaty has been concluded yet, so many years after the war, is highly irregular and deplorable.

There are several plans for the solution of the problems of European security, on which we have also stated our views. We consider that they may provide a starting point for negotiations, as they contain certain elements which might be acceptable to both sides. The accomplishment of concrete results, even on a modest scale, would be of enormous significance, as it would not imply the legalization of the status quo, which cannot provide a lasting basis for the consolidation of peace in Europe, but would mark the beginning of a new state of affairs and new relations, thus opening prospects for the permanent normalization of the international climate in general. Apart from this, there are no real prospects for the restriction of West German armament, outside of an agreement on European security.

Finally, I would like to mention the Yugoslav participation in the negotiations on the settlement of the German problem. We have nothing against the participation of any country whatever if thus agreed by the organizers of the conference, but if the question of a broader conference is raised again, then we consider that our country should certainly take part in such a meeting. From the standpoint of common interests, we see no justified reason to the contrary. We have stated on previous occasions that Yugoslavia was one of the first victims of German aggression and suffered immense human and material losses, and that she was one of the most active members of the anti-Hitlerite alliance. This, together with the fact that the entire policy of independent non-aligned Yugoslavia is directed toward the overcoming of the existing contradictions and the development of constructive international co-operation, undeniably entitles her to take part in one way or other in the deliberation of the German problem.

## Chronicle of Political Events

April 28 — The Yugoslav Education Council convened in Belgrade and approved the introductory provision of the fundamental course of studies and curricula for secondary schools.

April 29 — The Federal Executive Council met for the purpose of examining and approving the Report of the Council for 1958, which will be submitted to the Federal People's Assembly. The following legislative proposals were also approved on the occasion: the Customs Bill

the Decree on customs rates for all goods received or introduced by Yugoslav citizens from abroad, the rates of lawyers fees and legal expenses.

April 29 — Avdo Humo, member of the Federal Executive opened the International Agricultural Fair in Novi Sad. Many exhibitors from 21 countries are taking part in this event.

May 5 — The ninth enlarged plenary session of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia was held in Belgrade from May 5-8, under the presidency of Josip Broz-Tito. The agenda of the session called for the discussion of agricultural development. The report of Edvard Kardelj, Secretary-General of the Socialist Alliance, on "Problems of Socialist Policy in the villages" was followed by a lively and extensive discussion. Finally, the session adopted several decisions on Yugoslav farm policy (these resolutions are published in the "Documents" section of this review).

## Our New Contributors

Engineer MILORAD RISTIĆ, an associate of the Institute "Boris Kidrić" in Vinča, a member of the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission and the Technical Council of the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission. Previously, active in the machine building industry and a member of the Technical Council on Machine Building of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

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